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I.

INTRODUCTION

I was delighted to be given the opportunity to contribute to the
symposium organized by the Pepperdine Law Review in honor of Allen
Linden on the provocative topic: "Does the World Still Need United States
Tort Law? Or Did It Ever?" I was asked to provide an Antipodean
perspective, which is particularly appropriate for several reasons. Allen
Linden is, of course, one of the most distinguished Canadian tort lawyers.
He has made major contributions to the subject as a teacher, writer, and
judge. Within the common law world there is an important-if informal and
somewhat blurred-distinction between the United States and what we
might loosely call "the Commonwealth." Canada and the two Antipodean
jurisdictions of Australia' and New Zealand belong to this latter grouping, of
which England is the mother jurisdiction. 2 Canada, Australia, and New
* Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, John Fleming Centre for Advancement of
Legal Research, Australian National University College of Law. Thanks to Peter Cashman, Robert
Rabin, Peta Spender, and Stephen Sugarman for comments and assistance.
1. Describing Australia (or Canada, for that matter) as a single jurisdiction is convenient but
inaccurate. Australia, like Canada and the United States, is a federation. It has six states (New
South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia) and two
mainland territories (the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory). The federal entity
is the Commonwealth of Australia. There are, therefore, nine jurisdictions within Australia. For
convenience, in this paper I will use the term "the states" and the adjective "state" to refer to the
states and territories collectively.
2. See infra pp. 274-75.
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Zealand thus have a shared legal heritage. On the other hand, because of
Canada's geographical proximity to the United States, we might speculate
that its law has been influenced by U.S. law more than either Australian or
New Zealand law.
Another reason why an Antipodean contribution to the symposium was
especially appropriate is found in the person and work of the late Professor
John Fleming. Fleming, German by birth, was sent to school in England in
the 1930s and received his legal education at Oxford University.' After a
short stint on the faculty at University College, London, in the late 1940s, he
moved to Australia and for a decade taught law at Canberra University
College-a predecessor of my own institution, the Australian National
University.4 Under the influence and sponsorship of William Prosser,
Fleming migrated to the University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall),
where he spent the rest of his career, becoming the Cecil Shannon Turner
Professor of Law and working actively into his retirement.' Fleming was
undoubtedly one of the greatest tort scholars in the English-speaking world
in the latter half of the twentieth century. For many years he edited the
American Journal of Comparative Law, but despite his stature as a tort

lawyer, his work was relatively unknown in his adopted country. This is
probably because Fleming's magnum opus, The Law of Torts (of which
eight editions were published in his lifetime and a ninth in 1998, shortly
after his death)-although a fine work of comparative scholarship-was
firmly rooted in Australian law 6 and retained a strong Commonwealth
orientation throughout its nine editions.7 It was in Canada that The Law of
Torts probably had the most influence.' Professor Stephen Sugarman quotes
Allen Linden himself as saying that Fleming's book was "a bible for
Canadian law students and judges for more than forty years." 9 I am
confident that Allen will not object to my honoring him by invoking John's
spirit as an inspiration for reflecting comparatively on the tort law of the
United States, New Zealand, and Australia.
The basic arguments of this essay are that U.S. tort law has had
surprisingly little influence in the Antipodes and that this can best be
explained by structural and systemic differences between the various
societies we are concerned with and their respective legal systems. I must
begin by commenting on the meaning of the term "tort law," which I have

3. Stephen D. Sugarman, Presentingthe Fleming Award to Justice Allen Linden at Pepperdine
University School ofLaw, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 925, 925 (2005-2006).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6, The first edition was written in Canberra.
7. For an assessment of the work, see Peter Cane, Fleming on Torts: A Short Intellectual
History, 6 TORTS L.J. 216 (1998). A multi-authored tenth edition of Fleming's text is in preparation.
8. Id. at 216-17.
9. Stephen D. Sugarman, An Appreciation of John G Fleming, in PETER CANE & JANE
STAPLETON, THE LAw OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF JOHN FLEMING xxxii, xxxiii

(1998).
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elsewhere described as a "loose federation of causes of action."o Unlike
contract or property law, which may plausibly be portrayed as being
informed by a single overarching concept, tort law lacks a convincing
unifying theory, despite the best efforts of tort scholars from Oliver Wendell
Holmes onwards, and including, most recently, those who variously argue
that the cement of tort law (or, even more ambitiously, private law) is to be
found in the concepts of "corrective justice,"" "rights,"l 2 "wrongs," 3 or
"civil recourse." 4 Because of the heterogeneity of the legal phenomena we
call "torts," I think it wise to confine this paper to one, albeit probably the
most socially significant, aspect of the subject: tort liability for personal
injury resulting from negligence.
Something should also be said about the concept of "U.S. tort law." As
in Australia, basic tort law in the United States is state law, not federal law.
This is not to say that there is no federal tort law, but it is to say that there is
no federal tort law in the way that there is federal constitutional law or
federal administrative law, for instance. Nor is there a national common law
of tort law in the United States. In Australia, by contrast, there is, according
to the High Court, a single, national Australian common law." In addition
to being bound by decisions of the Australian High Court, appellate courts
of the States are bound by decisions of appellate courts of other States unless
convinced that such a decision is "plainly wrong."l 6 Unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Australian High Court is the final appellate court on
matters of State law as well as matters of federal law. In Australia, there is
no need or occasion for a "restatement" of the common law of torts because
7
the High Court "states" tort law authoritatively for the whole country.'

10. PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, 447 (2d ed. 1996).
I1. See ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
12. See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS (2007).

13. See John C. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917
(2010).
14. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not CorrectiveJustice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695 (2003).
15. Leslie Zines, The Common Law in Australia: Its Nature and ConstitutionalSignificance, 32
FED. L. REV. 337, 344-51 (2004); see also L.J. Priestley, A Federal Common Law in Australia?, 6
PUB. L. REV. 221 (1995).
16. FarahConstrs. Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 135 (Austl.); CAL No. 14 Pty
Ltd v Motor Accidents Ins. Bd (2009) 239 CLR 390, 448-51 (Austl.).
17. More deeply, I would speculate that the restatement phenomenon marks a subtle but
significant difference between the way the common law is understood in the United States and
Australia. Put crudely, I suggest that in the United States the process of making the common law is
thought of as quasi-legislative, and the courts that make the common law are thought of as quasilegislators. For instance, according to Melvin Eisenberg, courts have two social functions:
resolution of disputes and "enrichment of the supply of legal rules." MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4 (1988). This quasi-statutory understanding of the common
law is reflected in the collegiate way that the U.S. Supreme Court operates: The emphasis on the
formation of pluralities tends to shift the focus from the reasons for decision to the decision itself.
See also P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
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Of course, as in the United States, statutory tort law varies from one
Australian jurisdiction to another, but even in this context there is some
momentum toward uniformity. This is illustrated by the history of
Australian defamation law. Early in the twenty-first century, defamation
law in Australia was a highly complex patchwork of state regimes that
differed from each other in significant respects, including the extent to
which the law had been embodied in statute. This heterogeneity was seen as
problematic both for the media and for state courts hearing defamation
claims arising out of publication across state borders. The solution, adopted
by all states and territories in 2006, was to pass uniform legislation to the
effect that liability for defamation would be regulated by the common law
except to the extent that the uniform legislation provided otherwise.
So, while it makes some sense to talk about "Australian" tort law, the
idea of "U.S." tort law has much less resonance. Of course, with the
exception of the law of Louisiana, the various state tort laws in the United
States do share a common conceptual heritage in the English common law;
the institutions of the "tort system"-legislatures, courts, juries, lawyers,
insurers and so on-are more or less the same and function in similar ways
throughout the United States. To the extent that the concept of "U.S. tort
law" has meaningful reference, it is to what we might call its doctrinal and
institutional "common core."
My aim in this paper is not to identify and explain similarities between
the relevant rules and principles of U.S. tort law and Australian and New
Zealand tort law. No doubt that would be an interesting and valuable
project, and I am sure that it would disclose many similarities-but also
some significant differences. However, as I read the question posed by the
symposium's title, it is concerned not so much with similarities and
differences but primarily with whether any similarities can be explained in
terms of the influence of U.S. ideas and institutions or, indeed, as
borrowings from the United States. Our topic is, in short, the international
flow of legal ideas, and the question, succinctly put, is whether United States
personal injury tort law has been imported into Australia or New Zealand (or
whether it is likely to be in the future). The short answer is no! The main
aim of this paper is to explain why U.S. tort law has had so little influence
on Antipodean tort law. I will first deal quite briefly with New Zealand and
then say rather more about Australia.
Before doing that, however, it is worthwhile to mention two distinctive

131-32 (1987) (more on plurality decisions). In this light, the project of restating the common law
can be understood as a species of quasi-statutory codification or consolidation. By contrast, in
Australia (and in the Commonwealth more generally) the common law is understood more as an
ongoing discursive, dialogic process of practical reasoning and reason-giving rather than as a series
of rule-making events. This conception is uncongenial to a propositional mode of restatement that
largely suppresses reasons and reasoning; this may partly explain why the American Law Institute's
Restatements have had little impact outside the United States. The reason-based understanding also
puts a premium on judicial individuality, which can generate its own pathologies: Peter Cane,
Taking Disagreement Seriously: Courts, Legislatures and the Reform of Tort Law, 25 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 393, 404 (2005).
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features of U.S. tort law that one might expect would readily have found an
export market: "strict" product liability and class actions. As for the first,
the Australian common law of product liability is firmly rooted in the law of
negligence, and legislative schemes of "strict" product liability in Australia
have been based on the European model, not the U.S. model-although the
former was partly influenced by U.S. experience. 18 Regarding class actions,
there is no doubt that they are native to the United States and were
introduced into Australia only in the 1990s as the result of a "slow and
controversial" process of law reform.1 9 Although involving no direct
transplant, 20 according to Clark and Harris, the introduction of class actions
into Australia "was opposed by the business community, which feared that it
heralded the emergence of lawyer-driven, United States-style litigation in
Australia," and law reformers attempted to address these concerns by
pointing to features of procedural law that would likely forestall such an
outcome.21 It is ironic, therefore, that the Australian system is, in certain
respects, more plaintiff-friendly than that of the United States.22 However,
despite significant differences between the class action regimes in the two
countries, Australian courts "have been receptive to" U.S. class action
jurisprudence, and "there are numerous examples of cross-fertilization of
ideas." 23 That said, the striking fact is that "American-style class actions
may only be brought in two Australian jurisdictions"-at the federal level
and in the State of Victoria 24-and "no Australian state government is
currently [as of 2009] considering (or planning to consider) class action
reform."25 Although there are no reliable statistics about the number and
subject matter of class actions that have been instituted in Australia in the
past twenty years, it appears that they are much less used in cases of
personal injury than in cases of financial loss. 26

18. For an account of the development of the European model, see JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT
LIABILITY 37-65 (1994).
19. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, The Push to Reform Class Action Procedure in Australia:
Evolution or Revolution?, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 775, 776 (2008).
20. See id. at 776. The Australian class action regime was modeled on Rule 23 of the United
States' Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but differs in significant respects from its U.S. counterpart.
21. Id. In the Australian regime, there is no certification stage and there are no jury trials. The
costs rule is that the "loser pays". Lawyers may not charge contingency fees, and commercial
litigation funders play a major part. There is no common fund doctrine; nor are cy-pris remedies
available.
22. Id. at 777. For instance, the threshold criteria are much less onerous than in the United
States, and personal injury class actions are easier to mount.
23. RACHEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16-17 (2004).
24. Vince Morabito, Australia, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sa. 320, 320 (2009).
25. Idat321.
26. As of 2008, only about 35 of 164 class actions that had been commenced in the federal
jurisdiction involved product liability, and in only eighteen of these were damages claimed for
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II. NEW ZEALAND

So far as New Zealand is concerned, the lack of influence of U.S.
personal injury tort law-at least in the last forty years-can be easily
explained. Since 1972, the common law of tort has played only the most
marginal role in providing compensation for personal injuries in New
Zealand because of that country's no-fault accident compensation scheme.27
The scheme, which is administered by a public corporation, is a hybrid of
social insurance and social welfare, being funded partly by levies on riskcreating activities and partly by general taxation.28 Three categories of
personal injury fall within the scheme: injury by accident, injury resulting
from "medical misadventure," and injury resulting from work-related
illnesses and diseases.29 Illnesses and diseases unrelated to work are not
covered. 30 In cases that fall within the scheme, common law tort claims are
barred.3 ' In principle, this leaves significant room for the operation of the
tort system. In practice, however, because of the "accident bias" of tort
law,32 personal injury tort claims in relation to illness and disease are of
relatively minor significance. Victims of personal injuries that do not fall
within the scheme may have access to the general social security and social
welfare systems that sit alongside the accident compensation scheme.
One way in which the tort system supplements the accident
compensation scheme is by providing an avenue for claiming punitive
damages. Punitive damages play a somewhat more prominent role in U.S.
tort law than in Commonwealth tort law, probably because personal injury
tort law has a more regulatory flavor in the United States than in the major
Commonwealth jurisdictions, where its predominant function is
compensatory. In New Zealand, the compensation function is, of course,
primarily performed by the accident compensation scheme. One therefore
might have expected tort claims for punitive damages to acquire a
distinctively and perhaps even strongly regulatory flavor, especially since it

personal injuries. Jocelyn Kellam, S. Stuart Clark, & Christina Harris, Representative Actions: A
Review of 15 Years of Product Liability Class Action Litigation in Australia: Part 1, 16 TRADE
PRAC. L.J. 166, 172 (2008). Other personal injury class actions have arisen out of single-event
disasters. See generally S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, The Past,Present andFuture ofProduct
Liability and Other Mass Tort Class Actions in Australia, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1022 (2009).
27. For a detailed account of the scheme, see STEPHEN TODD ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS INNEW
ZEALAND 17-79 (4th ed. 2005). See also Symposium, Looking Back at Accident Compensation:
Finding Lessonsfor the Future,34 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 189 (2003); Peter H. Schuck,
Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 187, 188 (2008). A no-fault compensation
scheme can helpfully be distinguished from a strict liability regime such as workers' compensation.
Both dispense with proof of fault, but under the latter, the injured claims against an individual
responsible for the injury whereas under the former, the claim is made against a fund. The better
analogy to no-fault is not strict liability but the disability component of the social security system.
28. Accident Compensation Act 2001, ss 167, 213, 227,228 (N.Z.).
29. Rosemary Tobin & Elsabe Schoeman, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme:
The Statutory Bar and the Conflict ofLaws, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 495-96 (2005).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 498.
32. See generallyJANE STAPLETON, DISEASE AND THE COMPENSATION DEBATE (1986).
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has often been argued that the abolition of tort has significantly reduced
incentives for safe conduct. However, this has not happened. The debate
about punitive damages has taken place against the background of the
traditional, restrictive English approach to punitive damages, namely that
they are exceptional precisely because the main function of tort law is
compensatory. Indeed, the New Zealand Supreme Court has recently held
by a majority of four-to-one that punitive damages should only be available
in cases where the defendant harmed the plaintiff intentionally or with
subjective recklessness, and not where the harm was merely negligently
inflicted.3 4 The terms in which the debate about punitive damages has been
conducted suggest a major reason why U.S. tort law has had so little
influence in the Antipodes: both the Australian and the New Zealand legal
systems have much stronger historical and cultural links with the English
legal system than with the U.S. legal system. I will say more about this later
with particular reference to Australia.
It is worth noting, finally, that a significant number of U.S. jurisdictions
have statutory, no-fault auto accident compensation schemes that interact
with the common law of tort in various ways. 5 However, such schemes
have had no impact in New Zealand. There are two main reasons, I think.
The most obvious is that, both temporally and politically, New Zealand was
a world leader in this area (as in so many other social developments of the
past century and more). Of all the no-fault personal injury compensation
schemes around the world, New Zealand's is still, by far, the most wideranging, and it has significantly influenced thinking about personal injury
Pertinently, its architect, Sir Owen
compensation in many places.
Woodhouse, was invited to Australia in the 1970s to develop a proposal for
an even more comprehensive accident and illness compensation scheme
which, as events turned out, was killed off by the combination of a
constitutional crisis and lack of political will. 36 Nevertheless, to the extent
that no-fault compensation is debated in Australia these days, it is the New
Zealand scheme that provides the point of departure. By contrast, according
to Richard Gaskins, "[e]xcept for occasional experts who travelled to New
Zealand, Americans never closely inspected the Woodhouse strategy during
this period [i.e. the 1960s and 1970s], and they did not know enough about it
to reject it."3 7

33.

PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 482-83 (7th ed. 2006).

34. Couch vAttorney-General [2010] 3 NZLR 149 (SC).
35. See Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First Party Insurance:Advantages and Problems,
73 S. CAL. L. REv. 611 (2000).
36. Harold Luntz, Looking Back at Accident Compensation: An Australian Perspective, 34
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 279, 288 (2003).

37. Richard Gaskins, The Fate of "No-Fault" in America, 34 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
213, 223 (2003); see also Schuck, supra note 27, at 187-88.
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Another less obvious reason why experience with no-fault compensation
in the United States is of little relevance to New Zealand (and vice-versa) is
that New Zealand is a much more highly developed welfare state than the
United States. The New Zealand scheme was conceived and designed, and
it now operates, against very different social and economic backgrounds
than are found in the United States. Although it was, in many of its details,
modeled on the tort system, its core principle of community responsibility
represented a decisive and radical break from the ideology of individual
responsibility that underpins tort law. New Zealand accident compensation
is best understood as a form of social security, whereas in the United States,
no-fault schemes are a species of private insurance. Outside the United
States, probably the best-known American work on alternatives to tort is that
of Jeffrey O'Connell. His various no-fault plans sit firmly within a
framework of contract law and individual initiative.38 The major shift they
represent is not from tort to public social provision, but from tort and thirdparty liability insurance to contract and private first-party loss insurance.
Similarly, Stephen Sugarman describes his preferred approach as a "preaccident market in legal rights to bodily security., 40 No-fault compensation
has a quite different resonance in the United States than it does in New
Zealand and Australia, more in tune with market individualism than with
values of social solidarity and community welfare.41

38. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). This is particularly true

of "elective" versions of no-fault. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving Motorists
a Choice Between Fault and No-FaultInsurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61 (1986).
39. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & Janet Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of
Third-Party Tort Claims as a Means of FinancingFirst-PartyNo-Fault Insurance, 58 WASH. U. L.

Q. 55 (1980).
40. STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 201 (1989).
41. Robert Rabin has argued in private correspondence with me that the U.S. workers'
compensation system provides a counter-example to this statement. He points out that entitlement to
workers' compensation bars a tort claim and that the workers' compensation system dispenses with
the tort principle of full compensation. A short answer to this argument is that the statement in the
text does not refer to workers' compensation, which I do not include in the definition of a "no-fault"
scheme. See supranote 27. But a longer and better reply would be that the appearance of workers'
compensation is affected by the background against which it is viewed. In an expansive welfare
state such as New Zealand (or Australia), workers' compensation looks like an analogue of tort
because it involves making a claim against a responsible party, and it is funded by liability
insurance. It can be contrasted with the United Kingdom's industrial injuries scheme, which
replaced workers' compensation and is a component of the social security system. In this respect, it
is worth noting that the process that culminated in the introduction of the New Zealand accident
compensation scheme began as an inquiry into the workers' compensation system-which was, of
course, superseded by the no-fault scheme. By contrast, in a more market-oriented society such as
the United States, workers' compensation may look more like an analogue of social security.
However, there are (as far as I am aware) no proposals in the United States to replace employers'
strict liability to compensate workers with a no-fault scheme funded by levies on employers, which
would be more analogous to a social security disability scheme. This is probably because the
practical operation of the workers' compensation system is very similar to that of a social security
system. Nevertheless, there remains an important difference of principle between a compensation
system based on an idea of community responsibility to meet the needs of the injured and one based
on a concept of individual responsibility to repair harm.
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III. AUSTRALIA
A. Tort Reform andAlternatives to Tort

As in the United States, there are various alternatives to the common
law of tort operating in Australia.42 All jurisdictions have workers'
compensation schemes that differ from tort in two main ways: (1) the injured
worker does not have to prove that the injury was caused by negligence, and
(2) the assessment of compensation is less individualized. However, in
contrast to the position in the United States, entitlement to workers'
compensation does not bar a common law tort claim against the employer.
As a result, employers' liability in tort is an important feature of the
Australian system mainly because tort compensation may be more generous
than equivalent payments under the applicable workers' compensation
scheme. Both workers' compensation and employers' tort liability are
funded by compulsory third-party liability insurance.
In all state jurisdictions there is a statutory criminal injuries
compensation scheme. Such schemes are funded by general taxation.
Entitlement depends on establishing (on the balance of probabilities, not
beyond reasonable doubt) that the injury was the result of a crime (which
will typically also be a tort); but it is not necessary that the criminal be
successfully prosecuted or even identified. Once again, New Zealand was
the leader in this field, introducing its scheme in 1963.43 The rationale for
such arrangements has been much debated," but they are now so deeply
entrenched that their continuance is beyond question, even if their cost is a
cause of regular hand-wringing.
In a few states (the Northern Territory, Tasmania, and Victoria) there is
a no-fault, transport accident compensation scheme. Entitlement under the
Northern Territory scheme bars a tort claim, but the other two schemes
operate alongside the tort system. In practice, the Victorian scheme deals
with a very significant proportion of road accident personal injury claims;
tort claims are allowed only in serious cases. In both Victoria and Tasmania,
awards under the no-fault scheme are set off against any tort damages
received by the injured person, and in Tasmania, no claim can be made
under the road accident scheme if there is a right to claim workers'
compensation benefits.
Most of these various alternatives to tort are products of the 1970s and
early 1980s, and as I noted above, an abortive proposal was made in the

42.
2009).
43.
above.
44.

Briefly described in ROSALIE P. BALKIN & JiM L. R. DAVIS, LAW OF TORTS 393-410 (4th ed.
The scheme has since been superseded by the accident compensation scheme discussed
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
CANE, supra note 33, at 304-09.
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1970s for a comprehensive Australian no-fault personal injury compensation
scheme. Proposals for a no-fault road accident scheme made by the New
South Wales Law Reform Commission in 1984 proved fruitless, and the nofault movement finally ran out of steam in the late 1980s. However, the
defects of the tort system that were addressed by no-fault proposals
remained, and (as in the United States, according to Gaskins) 4 1 gave rise to
new policy initiatives aimed at reducing the amount of resources devoted to
the tort system. Two main strategies were pursued: caps on damages,
especially damages for loss of earnings and general damages, and procedural
reform, particularly experiments with alternative dispute resolution. By the
late 1990s, the attack on tort was being supported by claims of increasing
litigiousness and changes in tort law indicative of a "blame (or
'compensation') culture." 46 From one point of view, this new rhetoric
represented a continuation of the anti-tort battle by different means: if tort
cannot be abolished it should, at least, be cut down to size. In fact, however,
it signaled an ideological volte-face. Whereas the main concern of
advocates of no-fault was to compensate more injured people more
efficiently, the major thrust of the new "reform" movement was to reduce
the tort rights of the injured even if, in practice, this would have meant
making more people dependent on social security and social welfare. 47 So
strong was the backlash against the communitarian ideology of no-fault that
in a highly influential "tort reform" manifesto published in 2002, the Chief
Justice of New South Wales felt able to describe personal injury negligence
law as "the last outpost of the welfare state."48
In Australia, matters came to a head in 2002 with the occurrence of its
first full-blown "insurance crisis." 4 9 Undoubtedly, the causes of the crisis
were varied, but they are not fully understood. The immediate catalysts
were the collapse of a commercial insurer that held more than twenty
percent of the public liability insurance market in Australia and the
temporary insolvency of the country's largest mutual provider of medical
indemnity. Premiums for these two lines of cover rose suddenly and
Relevant stakeholder groups-especially local government
sharply.
authorities, not-for-profits, and medical practitioners-had considerable
political muscle. Despite the lack of supporting evidence,o significant
responsibility for the crisis was laid at the door of the tort system. It was

45. Gaskins, supra note 37, at 226.
46. A central text was P.S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY (1997).
47. Atiyah, however, still favored abolition. But, whereas in the 1970s he proposed its
replacement by a social insurance/social welfare scheme, in the 1990s he was promoting a U.S.-style
contractual solution-albeit against the background of a reasonably adequate social security and
social welfare system. See generally ATIYAH, supra note 46.
48. J.J. Spigelman, Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State, 76 AUSTRL. L. J. 432, 432
(2002).
49. Peter Cane, Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal Perspective, 27 MELB. UNIV. L.
REv. 649, 653 (2003).
50. indeed, it appears that the evidence supported the contrary conclusion. See E.W. Wright,
National Trends in Personal Injury Litigation: Before and After "Ipp, " 14 TORTS L.J. 233 (2006).
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argued that increases in the number of personal injury tort claims and
aggregate tort damages coupled with a pro-plaintiff bias in the lower
judiciary had made a significant, if not the most significant, contribution to
increases in insurance premiums. As in the context of class actions," here
we see can a negative influence of U.S. tort law on Australian debates about
tort law and, indirectly, on tort law itself. Especially by people who know
little about the U.S. tort system, and whose understanding of the Australian
tort system is limited, the former is often held up as a terrible warning of
what its Australian counterpart might become if steps are not taken to curb
"adversarial legalism"52 and the development of a full-blown compensation
and blame culture. However, the most important government-commissioned
report about the crisis did not link increases in premiums directly to the
53
number of tort claims and the aggregate amount of tort compensation.
Rather, it suggested more vaguely that tort doctrine had become too proplaintiff and that the tort system was costing too much.5 4
In response to the crisis and its alleged association with the tort system,
the nine Australian governments (six states, two mainland territories and the
Commonwealth) jointly appointed a "panel of eminent persons" to review
the law of negligence as a system of compensation for personal injury. The
chair of the panel was a judge of the New South Wales Court of Appeal
(Justice David Ipp, by whose name the panel's report is popularly knownthe Ipp Report). Its other members were the mayor of a New South Wales
country town, a clinical professor of surgery, and this writer. The panel's
terms of reference were based on two main ideas: that too large a proportion
of society's resources was devoted to the tort system, and that tort law set
the balance between the interests of injurers and the injured too heavily in
favor of the injured. The panel was instructed to make recommendations for
changes to the law of negligence that would reduce the overall cost of the
personal injury tort system and allocate more of the responsibility for
avoiding, and meeting the costs of accidents to the injured. The panel was
not invited to explore the alleged link between negligence law and the
insurance crisis but was, in effect, instructed to assume such a link despite
the lack of supporting empirical evidence.
The Ipp Report55 contained sixty-one recommendations, many of which
were soon embodied in legislation in all Australian jurisdictions now
generically referred to as "the Civil Liability Acts." Some of the changes
would be familiar to U.S. tort reform experts-notably caps on pecuniary
51.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

52.

ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).

53. Cane, supra note 49, at 657-58.
54. Id
55.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., REVIEW OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE: FINAL REPORT (2002),

available at http://revofieg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law

NegFinal.pdf.
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and non-pecuniary damages. Others, however, have not been tried in the
United States-such as reformulation of rules about standard of care and
causation designed to discourage courts from too readily imposing liability
for negligence.56 At the same time, the panel recommended against change,
such as has commonly been adopted in the United States, to the rule of joint
and several liability.57
There is empirical evidence that the various changes to tort law that
resulted from the Ipp Report-especially, perhaps, those imposing damages
thresholds-have had the intended effect of reducing the aggregate number
of tort claims, 58 and intuitively, it seems likely that the caps on damages
have reduced the size of the relatively small proportion of large awards.
However, the review of negligence law was not the only, or probably the
most important, step taken to deal with the insurance crisis. Particular
mention might be made of the suite of measures adopted to deal with the
issue of medical indemnity because these illustrate well some of the
differences between the U.S. and Australian landscapes in which tort law
operates.59
The medical indemnity crisis had its major effect only on certain highrisk procedural specialties-notably obstetrics, gynecology, and
neurosurgery. In Australia, such procedures are available both in the public
health system and privately. Many doctors in such specialties work within
both systems. Insurance for work undertaken in the public system is
provided as part of the remuneration package by the public health authorities
for which the doctors work.o It is only in respect of their private practice
that doctors need to buy their own cover. 61 Nevertheless, sharp and sudden
premium increases in 2001 and 2002 gave these groups of procedural
specialists very considerable political clout because of the need to ensure the
continued availability of their services especially outside big cities. The
private component of the work of specialists who practice in remote, rural
areas tends to be relatively smaller than that of their city counterparts, and
the increases in premiums tended to represent a greater proportion of the
private incomes of rural practitioners than of their metropolitan cousins.
The fear was that this would cause specialists to leave rural areas, depriving
their inhabitants of convenient access to specialist medical services. To
address this risk, the Commonwealth government enacted various publiclyfunded measures including a premium subsidy of 80% for premiums of more
than 7.5% of the doctor's gross private income; payment of half of damages

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. 7.1-.51.
Id. T 12.1-.26.
Wright, supra note 50.
For an excellent discussion of the United States situation, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE

LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 104-38

(2008).
60. See Fiona Tito Wheatland, Medical Indemnity Reform in Australia: "FirstDo No Harm, " 33
J. L. MED & ETHICS 429, 430 (2005).
61. See id.
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awards totaling more than $300,000 and of all claims over $20 million; and
an injection of capital of $480 million into the insolvent medical indemnity
insurer.62 Even assuming that the various reforms of negligence law enacted
in the wake of the Ipp Report have exerted significant downward pressure on
medical negligence claims and awards (which, anyway, represent a
miniscule proportion of personal injury litigation in Australia), the
immediate solution to the crisis involved very significant public spending
designed to prevent socially-oriented healthcare policy being undermined by
the vagaries of the insurance market. As far as I am aware, in none of this
did knowledge of experience in the United States play any part.
One of the main concerns of those who are dissatisfied with the tort
system is that in terms of the basic common law principle of full
compensation, it tends to under-compensate the most seriously injured and
disabled. The 2002 reforms may have exacerbated this effect. On the other
hand, tort compensation payable to a seriously injured person may be
considerably more generous than counterpart social security benefits, which
partly explains why personal injury litigation is often described as a
"lottery." The relative generosity of tort compared with social security can
provide a positive argument for damages caps. At least since the 1960s in
the United States, deterrence has been the prime function attributed to tort
law. One of the basic assumptions underlying "tort reform" in the United
States is that tort law and the tort system give socially undesirable incentives
to risk-takers. By contrast, personal injury tort law in Australia is primarily
viewed as a compensatory mechanism. 63 Since the late 1960s, outside the
United States, the main plank of the case for abolition of the tort system as a
means of dealing with personal injuries and its replacement by some form of
no-fault arrangement has been tort's inefficiency as a compensatory
mechanism, especially by comparison with social systems of support for the
disabled. Once tort is viewed as one component of a larger set of
compensation mechanisms it becomes harder to justify its generosity relative
to other members of the set and easier to contemplate making tort less
generous.
Placing the tort system within the wider context of provision for the
disabled also demonstrates how relatively insignificant tort law is in the
wider scheme of things. The biggest cause of disability is aging, and in
younger people, congenital defects and mental illness are highly
The Australian Productivity Commission has recently
significant. 4

62. Id at 437.
63. For a brief discussion of this point in relation to class actions, see Clark & Harris, supra note
19, at 802-03.
64. For Australia, see AusTL. GOv'T PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, ISSUES PAPER, DISABILITY CARE

AND SUPPORT 6-7 (2010) [hereinafter DISABILITY CARE AND SUPPORT], http://www.pc.gov.aul_
data/assets/pdf file/ 0007/98026/issues.pdf.
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estimated that less than one percent of disability results from "accidents." 65
Probably only a proportion of "accidents" would, even in theory, fall within
the tort system, and we know that only a proportion of injuries that could in
theory attract tort compensation actually do.
This explains why, since
2002 in Australia, proposals for change in the area of provision for the
disabled have not focused on the tort system, but on developing better
support, both public and private, for the disabled generally and, more
particularly, the severely disabled, whatever the cause of their disability.
Whereas tort reform in the United States is an ongoing project of high
political visibility, in Australia the tort reform exercise, precipitated by the
insurance crisis of 2002, was very unusual in its scope, intensity, and
political salience. Although abolition of tort is certainly not on the political
agenda in Australia (except, perhaps, as a mechanism for supporting the very
seriously disabled, and then only as part of a wider reform of the disability
support system), tort law does not carry the double ideological freight of
individual rights and health and safety regulation that it bears in the United
States. When Australians reject the New Zealand accident compensation
scheme as a model for their country, they do so not primarily because of its
ideological underpinnings, but either out of self or partisan interest, or
because of its supposed defects and inefficiencies.
B. StructuralandInstitutionalDifferences Between Australiaand the
UnitedStates

As in the United States, personal injury tort law is a firmly entrenched
feature of Australian law and society. However, there are various plausible
structural and cultural explanations of why U.S. tort law and the U.S. "way
of doing tort law" provide little more than cautionary tales in Australia. One
is implicit in the story told in the last section-Australia has very different
health and social security systems than those in the United States. In
particular, because of the system of universal health care (financed by a mix
of public and private funding), the tort regime is a relatively less important
source of support for the injured in Australia than in the United States.
Despite significant changes of government policy and practice associated
with the rise of economic liberalism since 1980, Australia is still best
described as a welfare state. This is not because-or, at least, not only
because-governments in Australia redistribute more resources from the
rich to the poor and from the healthy to the sick than governments in the
United States.
More deeply, I think, it shows that Australians are less

65. Id. at 9. But the Commission does not define "accident."
66. See CANE, supra note 33, at 207-14.
67. DISABILITY CARE AND SUPPORT, supra note 64, at 9 ("Currently, the overarching goal of
Australian governments' disability policies is to enhance the quality of life . . . of people with
disabilities . . . . That goal is reflected in a range of . .. measures by governments. These include

[among others] ... the provision of care and support for people with disabilities and their families.").
68. IRWIN GARFINKEL, LEE RAINWATER & TIMOTHY SMEEDING, WEALTH & WELFARE STATES:
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suspicious of government and government provision than Americans, and
that Australia is a less individualistic society than the United States.
A second explanation of why U.S. experience does not resonate in
Australia is that Australia has more robust legislative institutions than the
United States. This is related to the fact that in parliamentary systems of
government, the legislature and the executive are integrated, whereas in
presidential systems of the U.S. variety they are separated. In the former,
members of the political executive must be members of the legislature.
Australian governments will normally control at least the lower house of the
legislature and an administration will not be able to continue in office if it
loses control of that chamber. This arrangement has several significant
features. One is that party discipline is strong and the prime loyalty of the
typical member of Parliament is to their political party, not to their
constituency. Another is that the government has considerable control over
the legislative agenda and over the proceedings of Parliament. This enables
governments to achieve quite radical and far-reaching policy objectives
through legislation, and to do so relatively quickly, and without having to
Although the
make large, unpalatable concessions to opponents.
legislative responses in the various states and territories (and at the federal
level) to the 2002 insurance crisis were not uniform, their speed and scale
illustrate the capacity of Australian governments to act quickly and in
concert in a way that would be hard to imagine in the United States,
especially when one notes that although the governments of all the states and
territories at that time were controlled by the Labor (left-wing) Party, the
federal government (which, because of its responsibilities for insurance and
its large financial stake in the healthcare system, took the lead in the tort
reform process) was controlled by the Liberal (conservative) Party.
The dynamics of the legislative process affect (the perception of) the
role of courts. In the United States, courts are (seen as) political actors and
agents of social change to a greater extent than in Australia. One relatively
minor but pertinent illustration is found in the fact that in all Australian
jurisdictions, apportionment for contributory negligence ("comparative
negligence") was introduced by legislation, whereas in a number of U.S.
jurisdictions, it was the result of judicial action.7 1 Despite the enactment of
apportionment legislation in the United Kingdom in 1945, the High Court of
Australia continued to elaborate the exceptions to the common law rule of

Is AMERICA A LAGGARD OR LEADER? 68-71 (2010) (providing some data on income redistribution
in various countries).
69. For brief discussion, see NARELLE MIRAGLIOTTA , WAYNE ERRINGTON, & NICHOLAS
BARRY, THE AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM INACTION 73-74 (2010).
70. By the same token, however, it also enables an incoming government with different policy
objectives to undo its predecessor's achievements with relative ease.
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §7 cmt. a (2000).
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no recovery 72 and found, in that development in the "mother jurisdiction,"
no inspiration to change the Australian common law to allow apportionment.
Michael Green argues that the willingness of juries in the United States to
award negligent plaintiffs reduced damages, despite the formal rule of no
recovery, may have delayed the introduction of apportionment.7 ' This
suggestion has less force in relation to Australia where, by the mid-twentieth
century, the role of the civil jury was greatly diminished. For the same
reason, the contrary argument that "the willingness of juries to reach a
compromise verdict in cases of contributory negligence" was a catalyst for
the shift to comparative negligence 74 seems implausible in relation to
Australia. The best explanation for the longevity in Australia of the
common law rule of no recovery (albeit subject to a raft of qualifications) is
that courts would have considered apportionment too radical a change to be
achieved by judicial action and to be a proper subject only for the
legislature. It is not clear why it took some Australian legislatures until the
1960s to introduce apportionment. Here, the best explanation may simply
be lack of political pressure.
More significant than the story of comparative negligence is the fact that
courts in the United States (especially at the federal level) are seen as
playing a central role in setting and maintaining a balance of political power
between the legislature and the executive. For instance, by exercising their
judicial review functions, especially in relation to agency rule-making, U.S.
courts have become active participants in the regulatory system in a way,
and to an extent, that Australian courts have not and could not. It is a
reasonable speculation that the status of U.S. courts as political actors,
especially in the regulatory arena, has indirectly contributed to the
development of personal injury tort law as a tool of regulation and to the
idea that tort claims can make a significant contribution to the promotion of
health and safety. Of course, it must be true in the United States, as it is in
Australia, that the practical significance of the ordinary run-of-the-mill
personal injury tort claim is primarily compensatory, not regulatory.
However, at the systemic level with which we are concerned here, it is also
true that common law tort claiming and the tort system are understood to
have greater regulatory significance and potential in the United States than
in Australia.
This is reflected in the importance of the U.S. doctrine of preemption.
This doctrine, which is a function of federalism, is concerned with the
question (in the words of Robert Rabin) of "whether Congress intended to
displace tort law," where "Congress" stands for federal regulation and "tort

72. Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437 (Austl.).
73. See Michael D. Green, The Impact of the Civil Jury on American Tort Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV.
337, 343 (2011).
74. Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common
Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 407, 427 (1999); see also JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT
PROCESS 121-22 (1988).
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law" refers to common law tort claims in state courts. Preemption must be
distinguished from the "regulatory compliance defense" to a tort claim
according to which compliance with a statutory standard (whether contained
in federal or state legislation) may, but will not necessarily, satisfy
negligence law's standard of reasonable care. The regulatory compliance
defense operates similarly in Australian and U.S. tort law and in functional
terms is concerned, as Rabin puts it, with whether the statutory regulator or
the court is "better constituted to impose optimal standards of industry
conduct."76 By contrast, although in principle the Australian Parliament
could, within the boundaries of its legislative competence, either expressly
or impliedly bar common law tort claims in state courts with respect to
allegedly negligent breaches of federal statutory health and safety standards,
"regulatory containment of the tort system" " is not an issue in Australia.
There are several possible explanations for this striking difference. I
have already adverted to the first: in Australia, tort law is not understood as
being in competition with statutory regulation to the extent that it seems to
be in the United States. Adopting Rabin's words again, in Australia, tort is
not seen or commonly used as a means "to revisit and supersede the
regulatory approval process."7 A second possible explanation relates to the
respective ways the regulatory process is viewed in the two countries. It
seems to me that the U.S. regulatory system puts greater emphasis on
technological expertise and less emphasis on politics and value judgment
than the Australian system. Put slightly differently, in Australia, regulation
is more firmly located within the political process than it is in the United
States, and because courts in Australia are not viewed as political actors,
they are not considered to be a generally appropriate forum for engaging in
or with regulatory decision-making. The thrust of Rabin's proposal provides
a useful counterpoint. He argues that in cases where Congress has not
expressly barred tort claims, legislation should not be interpreted as doing so
impliedly in cases where the regulatory process labored under some
information deficit that the tort system can redress.7 9 This proposal is
motivated, he says, by a desire to "forge a path that recognizes the distinct
benefits that both regulation and tort have to offer" to the project of
promoting health and safety.80
A third possible explanation lies in differences between U.S. and

75. Robert L. Rabin, Territorial Claims in the Domain of Accidental Harm: Conflicting
Conceptions of Tort Preemption, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 987, 990 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1002.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1009.
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Australian federalism to which some reference has already been made."
The most important difference is found in the respective roles of the U.S.
Supreme Court and the Australian High Court. The Australian High Court,
unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, is the ultimate court of appeal on matters of
state as well as federal law. As a result, the fact that in Australia (as in the
United States) tort law is primarily a state legislative responsibility does not
generate the degree of tension between federal statutory regulation and the
state common law of torts as it appears to do in the United States because
there is a national common law in Australia. Australia is a single common
law jurisdiction in a way the United States certainly is not. This helps to
explain why Australian tort law addresses the relationship between the
common law of negligence and statutory standards through its equivalent of
the regulatory compliance defense, but has not developed a doctrine
analogous to preemption to address the relationship between federal
regulation and state tort claims. In other words, in Australia, the relationship
between tort law and regulation lacks the federal dimension it has in the
United States.
Why Australian CourtsRarely Cite U.S. Tort Decisions

C.

The lack of influence of U.S. tort law in Australia is reflected in the fact
that citation of U.S. tort decisions by Australian courts is relatively rare
compared with citation of decisions from other major common law
jurisdictions. This is certainly not because Australian courts are uninterested
in what goes on elsewhere. Although the Australian land mass (at
approximately 7.7 million square kilometers), rivals in size that of the
United States (at approximately 9.6 million square kilometers), Australia is a
small nation of only about twenty-one million people. Despite a significant
indigenous population and increasing immigration from Asia to Australia,
Australian culture is predominantly Anglophone and European. That fact,
coupled with Australia's location on "the other side of the world," has
produced a zeitgeist that is outward-looking and constantly conscious of its
links with, and dependence on, the rest of the world. Put bluntly, the most
obvious reason why Australian courts do not look to the United States for
inspiration and guidance is that Australia was once part of the British
Empire but has never been part of the American empire.
This is not to say that U.S. law has had no influence in Australia.
Indeed, the U.S. Constitution was a major source of inspiration for the
founders of the Commonwealth of Australia in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. In particular, the first three chapters of the Australian
Constitution mirror the first three Articles of the U.S. Constitution in
establishing a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive,
and the judiciary. As a result, U.S. constitutionalism continues to exert
influence in Australia. However, even in this area the influence is limited.

81.

274

See supra pp. 259-60.

[Vol. 38: 257, 2011]

UnitedStates Tort Law in the Antipodes
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Australia has no constitutional bill of rights. One of the states and one of the
territories have enacted statutory bills of rights, but these establish a weak
form of judicial review rather than the strong form operative in the United
States.82 Human rights thinking in Australia is based much more on
European and international models than on U.S. experience. Moreover,
separation of powers is understood very differently in Australia than it is in
the United States. The Australian governmental system is parliamentary
rather than presidential. The result is twofold: first, in Australia, unlike the
United States, the legislature and the executive are integrated rather than
separated; and, second, partly for this reason, judicial power is more strictly
separated from executive power in Australia than in the United States.
However, the public law of the Australian states is significantly different
from the public law of the Commonwealth of Australia. None of the
constitutions of the Australian states embodies formal separation of powers,
and although federal public law affects state public law in various ways,
there was no reception of principles of U.S. constitutionalism at the state
level. Even more than the federal system, the governmental systems of the
states are firmly rooted in English soil.
Important to understanding the orientation of Australian law is the fact
that as a nation, Australia emerged as a result of evolution rather than
revolution. When the British settled Australia in 1788, they brought both
common law and statutory law with them. The legal system of the
indigenous inhabitants was unknown or ignored. The official date of
reception of statutes of the Westminster Parliament into the colony of New
South Wales was July 25, 1828: all statutes in force at that date were
automatically applied in the colony.8 4 Although the Commonwealth of
Australia came into being at an identifiable moment in 1901 as the result of
a deliberate process of building a nation and drafting a constitution, this
event only marked the beginning of the process of creating an autonomous
legal system. The constitutions of the various colonies that became the
States of the new federation continued in force. These constitutions
reflected the development of responsible government (i.e., the integration of
legislature and executive) in the nineteenth century in both the United
Kingdom and the Australian colonies. For most of the twentieth century, the
ultimate court of appeal in the Australian legal system was the U.K. Privy
Council. Senior judges from Commonwealth countries often sat as members

82. See Victorian Charterof Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (Austi.); Human Rights
Act 2004 (ACT) (Austl.).
83.
84.

PETER CANE, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND ADJUDICATION 82-86 (2009).
BRUCE KERCHER, AN UNRULY CHILD: A HISTORY OF LAW IN AUSTRALIA 74-75 (1995).

Until as recently as 1985 the law of limitation of actions in the Australian Capital Territory was
based on a 1623 statute of the English Parliament. F.A. TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF
TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 632 (1985).
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of the Privy Council, but most of its judges were members of the U.K.
House of Lords, the final appellate court for England and the other U.K.
jurisdictions (until its replacement by the U.K. Supreme Court in 2009).
This coincidence of membership enhanced the influence of the English
common law in Commonwealth jurisdictions; especially in matters of
private law, decisions of the House of Lords (and the English Court of
Appeal) were treated with the greatest respect by Australian courts even
though they were not technically binding. This was partly because-at least
until the middle of the twentieth century-Australia needed more law
(especially common law) than it could produce locally. For obvious reasons,
it looked mainly to the United Kingdom to supply that need.
Most rights of appeal from the High Court of Australia to the Privy
Council were abolished by the mid-1970s, but appeals from state courts
remained possible. The jurisdiction of the Privy Council in Australia was
not finally and completely removed until 1986, when two pieces of
legislation called the Australia Acts, enacted in parallel by the Westminster
and Australian Parliaments, abolished most of the remaining links between
the Australian and U.K. legal systems.85 This event has profoundly
influenced the development of Australian law, including tort law. It cleared
the ground for the development of an Australian national common law (as
already discussed). Subsequent developments in the United Kingdomparticularly the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the
consequent impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on
English private law86-together with a new sense of legal independence and
nationalism in Australia and growth of local production of statute and
common law (including tort law), have generated increasingly significant
divergences between English and Australian tort law. However, U.S. tort
law has played no discernible part in this process, and there has been no
wholesale, or even retail, importation of U.S. tort law into Australia since
1986.
A final factor that may help to explain the near-invisibility of U.S. tort
law in Australia (and to which brief reference has already been made) is the
continued use of civil juries in the United States to a much greater extent
than in Australia. Except in the state of Victoria, it has been many years
since juries have played a significant role in tort litigation in Australia.
The abolition of the jury has had subtle but profound effects on tort doctrine.
It has, for instance, led to much greater judicial elaboration of damagesassessment principles 88 and the standard of care (i.e., the "breach" question)

85. GERARD CARNEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE AUSTRALIAN STATES AND
TERRITORIES 66-74 (2006). Note, however, that the British Monarch is also the Monarch of
Australia.
86. See, e.g., JANE WRIGHT, TORT LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2001).
87. Jane Stapleton, Controlling the Future of the Common Law by Restatement, in EXPLORING
TORT LAW 262, 265 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005).
88. See FLEMING, supra note 74, at 123 ("By far the widest scope for jury discretion is its power
to assess damages . .. [T]he American law of.. . tort damages for personal injuries, is surprisingly
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in negligence. Regarding damages, the result-in the United Kingdom to a
greater extent than in Australia-has been an approach to the assessment of
general damages based on a semi-authoritative "tariff' of injuries and
awards designed to achieve predictability and uniformity."
Concerning the standard of care, the demise of the jury has inevitably
affected judicial understandings of the relationship between the duty
question and the breach question in negligence cases. Mark Gergen argues
that the U.S. system uses the duty/breach distinction to strike a balance
between the predictability and "expertise" of judicial decision-making on the
one hand, and the "popular" and flexible character of jury decision-making
on the other, at least with regard to "normative" or "moral" issues such as
reasonable care. 90 Jane Stapleton explains how general "no-duty" rules,
which nevertheless allow for fact-specific exceptions, enable judges to keep
the issue of reasonable care from the jury and simultaneously achieve what
are considered to be fair results in individual cases.91
In a system without juries, the duty/breach distinction can operate to
allocate decision-making power-not as between judge and jury, but as
between appellate and trial court. The more closely an appellate court tailors
its findings of duty to the facts of particular cases, the less leeway it leaves
trial judges in future cases to deal differently with factually similar claims.
This technique can be seen at work in the deployment of distinctions
between the existence of a duty of care on the one hand and its "scope" or
"content" on the other, 92 and between the scope or content of duty on the
one hand and standard of care on the other. Appellate courts that wish to
control trial judges may use the language of "scope" or "content" to narrow
a general duty in such a way as to restrict the freedom that trial judges would
have if the facts of the case were treated as going to standard of care rather
than duty. This is because decisions on issues of duty can create precedents,
whereas decisions on standard of care cannot. For example, in Modbury
Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil,93 the question was whether the

owner of a shopping centre could be held liable to an employee of a tenant
of the centre who was mugged in the centre's car park late at night after
work. It is firmly established that an occupier of land (such as the owner)
owes a (general) duty of care to lawful visitors (such as the employee). One
way of addressing the issue that arose in Modbury would be to ask whether

unformulated.").
89. For the United Kingdom, see JUDICIAL STUDIES BD., GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF
GENERAL DAMAGES INPERSONAL INJURY CASES (9th ed. 2008).
90. Gergen, supra note 74, at 431-38.
91. See Stapleton, supra note 87, at 262.
92. See, e.g., Cole v S. Tweed Heads Rugby Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469, 1 1
(Gleeson, C.J.) (Austl.).
93. (2000) 205 CLR 254 (Austl.).
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the owner's (general) duty to this employee extended to protecting her from
criminal acts of third parties. Another approach would be to ask whether, in
all circumstances of the case, the owner had been negligent in not taking
steps that would probably have prevented the attack. The former technique
gives trial judges less scope for taking account of the detailed facts of
particular cases than the latter.
On the other hand, we also find appellate courts discouraging trial
courts-which, unlike juries, typically give reasons for their decisionsfrom framing standards of care at high levels of generality in such a way as
effectively to embed them in the law as statements of duty. This approach
may be understood as the converse of that analyzed in the previous
paragraph: appellate courts that want to control trial judges by making factspecific findings of duty will also likely want to prevent trial judges from
transforming fact-specific findings of breach into legal holdings of factspecific duty. The High Court of Australia has an incentive to take both
approaches because in recent years it has been keen to establish itself as the
ultimate authority on the Australian common law, including the common
law of torts. Around the time of the 2002 insurance crisis, it was frequently
said that trial judges as a group had become too pro-plaintiff. Harold Luntz
has documented a pro-defendant shift by the High Court starting in the late
1990s; 95 one argument used against certain aspects of the statutory tort
reforms introduced to address the crisis was that they were unnecessary
because the High Court had already "reined in" tort law. Be that as it may, it
seems that the High Court sees one of its functions as being to regulate
decision-making by trial courts, and the duty/breach distinction can be used
to that end.
Over the past decade and more, the High Court has also devoted
considerable attention to the relationships between itself as the ultimate
appellate court, (intermediate) state courts of appeal, and trial courts. It has
given leave to appeal in a significant number of cases in which the basic
issue is whether the intermediate court should have interfered with the trial
court's fact-specific decision-making on the issue of reasonable care. This
approach may, once again, be interpreted as witnessing a concern of the
High Court to establish itself (and not intermediate appellate courts) as the
prime regulator of the application of fact-sensitive standards by trial courts.
Having said all this, however, I think that the abolition of juries has
actually diverted attention away from the power-allocation function of the
duty concept. Although manipulation of the distinctions between the
existence and content of duties and between content of duty and standard of
care may affect the allocation of decision-making power, it is by no means
clear that this has been its purpose. For instance, the aim of discouraging

94. FRANCIS TRINDADE, PETER CANE & MARK LUNNEY, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA

451-52 (4th ed. 2007).
95. Harold Luntz, Torts Turnaround Downunder, I OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 95, 96
(2001).
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trial judges from enunciating general standards of conduct may also be to
strike an appropriate balance between the citizen-oriented values of
predictability and flexibility. In Australian law, the duty concept is
primarily understood as a technique not for regulating the allocation of rulemaking power, but for specifying the scope of legal liability. This would
explain why Australian law contains an eclectic collection of bright-line noduty rules (unrelated to concepts such as foreseeability and reasonableness)
and much more fact-sensitive principles. Bright-line principles include the
rules that advocates do not owe their clients a duty of care for either in-court
or out-of-court conduct relating to the case 96 and that a child cannot sue a
doctor for wrongful birth. 97 By contrast, the principles governing the scope
of liability for mental harm98 and economic loss" are very fact-sensitive.
Indeed, the general approach currently approved by the Australian High
Court for determining whether a duty of care exists involves taking account
of "salient features" of the individual cases. oo Lists of salient features can
be extracted from the case law, but such lists are necessarily provisional and
open-ended. The choice between bright-line rules and fact-sensitive
principles seems to depend not on considerations of institutional design but
rather on the desirability of establishing boundaries of tort liability that
appropriately take account of the interests of both potential doers and
potential sufferers of harm. In short, in Australian law, duty is first and
foremost a device for controlling liability, not for allocating the power to
make decisions about liability.
D.

U.S. and Australian Tort Scholarship

Finally, we may deepen our understanding of the relationship between
U.S. and Australian tort law by paying some attention to differences between
tort scholarship in the two countries. This is not because such differences
explain that relationship, but because they reflect intellectual factors and
features of legal culture that help to explain the near-invisibility of U.S. tort
At some risk of over-generalization and overlaw in Australia.
simplification of complex realities, I think it is fair to say that Antipodean
tort scholars are, as a group, more formalist and doctrinal in approach than
their typical U.S. counterparts. The effects of realism and instrumentalism
have been less and have come later in Australia than in the United States.
Nor has the economic and regulatory approach to tort law taken hold in

96. TRINDADE, CANE & LUNNEY, supra note 94, at 531-33.
97. Id. at 536-38.

98. Id. at 479-84.
99. Id. at 492-513.
100. Id. at 467-68.
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Australia in the way it has in the United States. In the Antipodes, the centre
of gravity of academic analysis and thought about private law lies much
closer to notions of corrective justice. Of course, such ideas have also had
some influence in the United States. After all, one of the leading proponents
of corrective justice accounts of tort law in particular and private law more
generally-Jules Coleman-is American. Moreover, two of the most
influential and prolific U.S. tort scholars of a younger generation-John
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky-propound a version of corrective justice
theory.' 0
On the other hand, it is significant that modem corrective justice
approaches were developed (starting in the 1970s in North America) in
reaction and as an alternative to instrumentalist, economic, and regulatory
accounts of tort and other areas of law, which gained no secure purchase
outside the United States. Scholars in the United Kingdom and Australia,
for instance, have embraced corrective justice and wrong-based or rightbased accounts of private law not because they offer an attractive alternative
to instrumentalist accounts but because they seem to fit well with common
pre-theoretical understandings and interpretations of the law. Whereas U.S.
corrective justice theorists may seem to be swimming against the tide of
widespread regulatory and functionalist thinking about tort law, their
counterparts outside the United States are more likely to see themselves as
merely articulating an implicit but fundamental feature of legal thought.
An illuminating, if impressionistic, contrast with the position in
Australia and other Commonwealth jurisdictions is provided by the situation
in Israel as depicted by Haim Sandberg in a recent article in which he
describes U.S. influence on legal education and scholarship in Israel in terms
of colonization. 102 Increasingly, Israeli legal scholars will have done
graduate legal work in the United States. By contrast, with the possible
exception of public law scholars, Australians who acquire graduate
qualifications abroad are still more likely to do so in the United Kingdom
than in the United States. No university in the United States can claim a
reputation in Australia as a centre for sophisticated private law scholarship
to rival that of Oxford or Cambridge. My impression is that Australian
private law scholars who take study leave abroad are more likely to do so in
the United Kingdom (or Canada) than in the United States. This orientation
toward the United Kingdom is reflected in the success of the biennial
Obligations conference series, which was initiated at the University of
Melbourne in 2002 and has "become a leading forum for discussions of

101. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 925.
102. Haim Sandberg, Legal Colonialism-Americanization of Legal Education in Israel, 10
In personal
GLOBAL JURIST Article 6 (2010), http://www.bepress.com/gj/voll0/iss2/art6.
correspondence, Stephen Sugarman said:
[F]rom here I see how U.S. scholarship is influencing not just Israel, but Latin America,
some parts of Germany, younger scholars in Japan, etc. I think that over time legal
scholarship will become more connected to social sciences and more empirically based
everywhere, including Australia.
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private law in the common law world."l 03 Participants in ObligationsI were
predominantly from the major Commonwealth jurisdictions, including
Australia and the United Kingdom. Eight years later, Obligations V
attracted U.S. scholars who are increasingly interested in and willing to
engage with ideas about private law generated outside the United States.
Sandberg suggests that the Americanization of legal education and
research in Israel has had various effects on the legal system. One effect is
that Israeli scholars have become less inclined to address an audience that
includes Israeli judges and legal practitioners; they are now more interested
in communicating with the U.S. scholarly community. Another is that U.S.educated scholars increasingly "distance" themselves from Israeli law with
the aim of "getting closer to global law, in general, and American law in
particular." 04 By contrast, most Australian (and U.K.) scholars of tort law
in particular and scholars of the law of obligations more generally show
relatively little interest in U.S. law. This is, perhaps, partly the result of the
complexity of the U.S. legal system and the difficulty of penetrating and
navigating the huge and immensely dense forest of primary and secondary
U.S. legal materials.'0 5 But it may also be that the prime intended audience
for the best U.S. legal scholarship consists of scholars. By contrast, much of
the best Commonwealth scholarship (apart from that with a primarily
pedagogical purpose) is still directed, at least in part, to those involved in the
practical administration of the law, including judges, lawyers, and policymakers. Commonwealth scholars, to a greater extent than many of the most
influential U.S. scholars, see themselves as part of what Sandberg calls "the
broader population of jurists."' 06 By contrast, at least to the outsider, many
scholars in the elite U.S. law schools seem to identify more with, and be
more oriented towards, the broader academy, especially philosophers,
historians, and social and political scientists. Such differences are, of
course, only differences of degree, but they are nevertheless real and
significant.

103. Obligations V: Rights and Private Law, UNIV. OF OXFORD & UNIV. OF MELBOURNE,

http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/obligations/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
104. See Sandberg, supranote 102, at 10.
105. The American Law Institute's restatements of the law, which might provide a useful insight
into U.S. law for the foreign scholar, are relatively unknown and unused outside the United States.
Fleming's text was the first substantial treatise to focus on Australian law. See supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text. Before its publication, Australian students and lawyers relied on English texts.
U.S. tort treatises have never been used much in Australia. One result of lack of interest in U.S. law
is that few Australian scholars publish in U.S. law journals (especially earlier in their careers). To
the outsider, the typical student-edited U.S. law journal appears unwelcoming to articles that are
significantly concerned with foreign law or that engage in serious comparative analysis. Australian
scholars who aspire to publish abroad-especially those who work in private law-generally prefer
the leading U.K. journals.
106. See Sandberg, supra note 102, at 9.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Sandberg fears that the Americanization of Israeli legal scholarship will
affect the way law is taught in Israeli universities and, in the longer term,
lead to an Americanization of the Israeli legal system to the detriment of
Israeli society. 07 In other words, he posits the sort of causal connection
between legal education and scholarship on the one hand, and law and the
legal system on the other, that I avoided at the beginning of the previous
section. Even if Sandberg is right in positing such a link, I think we can
safely speculate that the future for U.S. law in the Antipodes is bleak. There
is no sign that the Australian legal academy and legal education will be
significantly Americanized any time soon. A legal transplant is likely to be
successful only if it is needed and is compatible with the system into which
it is being transplanted. There was certainly a time when Australia, for
instance, needed more law than it could produce locally. But for the various
reasons I have explained, the United States was not the place it looked to
supply that need. I have also suggested cultural and systemic differences
between Australia and the United States that might lead us to expect that any
attempt to graft U.S. tort law onto the Australian root-stock would have
ended in rejection or at least serious weakening of the host. Law is, to a
significant extent, historically and culturally specific--or "path-dependent,"
as the theorists might say. The Australian historical and cultural experiences
are sufficiently different from their American counterparts to explain why
Australia has not needed U.S. tort law in the past and is very unlikely to
need it in the future.

107. See id. at 10.
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